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Is a Problem Shared a Problem Halved? Shared Services and Municipal Efficiency 
It has long been argued that shared services represent an efficacious means of securing 
efficiencies for municipalities. Indeed, pressures from fiscal austerity, taxation limitations, 
and the spectre of forced amalgamations have resulted in an increasing uptake of shared 
service arrangements. However the extant evidence is rather inconclusive and is largely 
restricted to analysing the nett efficiency outcomes for the specific service shared. We 
broaden this evidential base by examining the association between shared service production 
and the efficiency of entire municipalities. Our analysis, employing a five year panel of data, 
suggests that shared services are associated with a statistically significant reduction in 
overall municipal efficiency. We conclude by explicating on the public policy implications 
arising from our prima facie surprising results. 
 
Shared services are increasingly being seen as an efficacious means of securing efficiencies 
in the production of municipal goods and services. In America fiscal pressures arising from 
taxation limitations, in particular, combined with concerns regarding equity and difficulties 
prosecuting consolidations have largely been the impetus for municipalities to embark on co-
operative arrangements (Feiock, 2007). In Europe, fiscal austerity has been the main 
motivation for municipalities entering into shared service arrangements even though there are 
relatively fewer barriers to consolidation (Bel and Warner, 2014). By way of contrast shared 
services in the Antipodes mainly arise in response to higher-tier government threats of 
consolidation designed to address waning financial sustainability (Dollery et al., 2016). 
Indeed, in response to a belief in the efficacy of shared services, some higher-tier 
governments have provided substantial financial and legislative support to facilitate 
cooperative ventures. It is therefore important that we have a comprehensive understanding 
of the efficiency outcomes that might be expected.  
However, the extant empirical evidence on shared services is rather mixed and inconclusive 
(Aldag and Warner, 2017). Moreover, evidence is largely restricted to an analysis of the nett 
pecuniary outcomes for the specific service produced co-operatively (often solid waste 
disposal, and generally employing only a single year of data) or on case-studies of shared 
services in a single municipality (see, for example Conway et al. 2011; KPMG, 2015). We 
seek to broaden the evidential base by considering the effect of shared service production on 
the efficiency of an entire jurisdiction of municipalities over a five year panel of data. As we 
will explain below, there are a number of costs that are largely exogenous to the specific 
shared service being produced that might reasonably be expected to affect efficiency of the 
municipality as a whole. Analyses that do not look beyond the shared service in question 
might reasonably be expected to overlook these exogenous costs and thus produce a more 
favourable view of the efficiency implications arising from shared services than might be 
strictly warranted.  
The main reason put forward for considering shared service provision of municipal goods and 




  Page 2 
for specific functions and hence capture economies of scale (Kwon and Feiock, 2010; Bel 
and Warner, 2014). However, there are other reasons for pursuing shared services, apart from 
the hope of securing efficiencies (although the promise of efficiencies are the most cited and 
prominent reason; Feiock, 2007). For instance, shared services are often pursued by 
municipalities purely as a means to escape amalgamations (the argument generally proceeds 
along the lines that shared services can capture efficiencies relating to scale without the loss 
of identity and disruption associated with amalgamation; Conway et al., 2011). In addition, 
shared services may be pursued in order to augment limited managerial and technical 
expertise (Bel and Warner, 2014; Dollery et al., 2016), reduce professional isolation (Conway 
et al., 2011), facilitate co-ordination of regional infrastructure planning (Kim and Warner, 
2016), promote innovation (Carr and Hawkins, 2013) and improve service quality (Aldag and 
Warner, 2017). Moreover, shared production of municipal goods and services can provide an 
efficacious path to internalising externalities (whereby benefits or costs imposed on 
municipal neighbours as a result of municipalities operating in isolation become distributed to 
partner municipalities in the event that the relevant service is shared; see Kwon and Feiock, 
2010). Shared services might also be pursued in order that political representatives can secure 
benefits (such as additional or improved services) for defined constituent groups and take 
credit for same, which explains why shared services are more common where mayors are 
directly elected (see, Dollery et al., 2016). 
This paper addresses an important gap in the scholarly literature by providing a robust 
assessment of the association between the efficiency of an entire municipality and whether or 
not the municipality was involved in at least one shared service arrangement. We also 
investigate the association between specific categories of shared services and municipal 
efficiency, by employing an exhaustive eight part typology in a sequent set of analyses. To 
achieve our objective of understanding the effect of shared services on municipal efficiency 
we first construct a theoretical framework to describe the benefits and costs of shared 
services, drawing largely from the transaction cost theory approach which is the dominant 
framework in this field. Particular attention is paid to exogenous costs arising from shared 
services that might be otherwise overlooked by analyses restricted to only the service shared 
(rather than the entire municipality). Following this we outline our empirical methodology 
and data sources employed to investigate the two propositions developed in the earlier 
section. Thereafter we present the results arising from our second stage regressions of a five 
year panel of efficiency data (2012 to 2016 inclusive) based on the entire cohort of 68 general 
purpose municipalities which comprise the jurisdiction of South Australia. We conclude our 
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The Conditions Required for Efficient Shared Services 
Nett efficiency of shared services is equal to the difference between production benefits and 
the transaction and agency costs associated with managing the co-operative venture (Kwon 
and Feiock, 2010). Production benefits are mostly attributable to economies of scale which 
refer to the case whereby long-run average total costs fall as output increases. It should be 
noted that not all municipal services exhibit economies of scale, and even when total average 
costs are responsive to output size this association generally only holds over relatively short 
domains (Fahey et al., 2016). Once economies of scale have been fully exhausted (that is, 
when average total costs cease to decrease with increased output and hence efficiency is first 
maximised) production generally enters a relatively lengthy domain of constant returns 
whereby there is no change to average total costs as output increases (and there is therefore 
no change to efficiency for the particular service in question). If output is expanded even 
further, then diseconomies of scale emerge – average total costs begin to increase as output 
increases – and relative inefficiency sets in. Figure 1 provides a graphical depiction of the 
association between average total costs and output for services which exhibit scale 
economies. Clearly production benefits arising from shared services will be maximised where 
output is increased from a point to the left of the output level at which efficiency is first 
maximised to an output level that is less than the point at which diseconomies of scale set in. 
The first obstacle then in reaping nett efficiencies from entering into shared service 
arrangements is to select a service for which an association between average total cost and 
output size exists, and for which the combined production of partner municipalities will not 
incur significant diseconomies of scale.  
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
Even if economies of scale can be captured, the existence of transaction and agency costs 
directly associated with the co-operative arrangement may well consume the entire 
efficiencies generated, or indeed exceed the benefits and therefore generate nett inefficiency 
(Feiock, 2007). Transaction costs arise due to uncertainty regarding future events, 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour of others, and occur in both shared and 
in-house production (but are more easily managed in the latter; Brown and Potoski, 2005). 
Transaction costs include information and co-ordination costs, negotiation and division costs, 
monitoring and enforcement costs, and defection costs.  
Information and co-ordination costs include the expense of garnering information on 
prospective partners (their preferences and resources) and ensuring that all partners are kept 
informed regarding the performance of the shared venture (which might involve the expense 
of engaging staff to administer the enterprise (Dollery et al., 2016) along with costs 
associated with meeting statutory and accounting standard requirements). Negotiation costs 
relate to the initial expense of coming to agreement regarding the quantity and quality of 
shared services to be produced and how the venture will be resourced. Division costs are the 
outcome of negotiations and refer to how the gross transaction surplus is distributed among 
shared service partners (see, Kwon and Feiock, 2010). There is some evidence to suggest that 
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and that bigger municipalities may use their relative power to obtain a disproportionate share 
of the gross savings arising from the venture (Carr and Hawkins, 2013). Moreover, the 
heterogeneity of different partners often means that relative division surpluses might differ 
substantially even if the gross transaction surplus is distributed evenly. This is because 
different partner municipalities are likely to have provided different standards of services and 
have had different unit costs for producing the service. 
The performance of the shared service venture and the partners themselves must be 
monitored to ensure that commitments are kept and opportunistic behaviour does not occur. 
Moreover, if unsatisfactory behaviour is identified then enforcement costs are likely to be 
borne by the party seeking to correct unsatisfactory behaviour. Defection costs are the last 
component of transaction costs and are generally considered to refer to the cost incurred 
when a partner municipality to a shared service withdraws from the co-operative venture 
(Conway et al. 2011; Dollery et al. 2016; Carr and Hawkins, 2013). This cost occurs due to 
the change in service level output (reduced output may result in an increase to the long-run 
average total cost), potential need to renegotiate contracts, potential need to purchase new 
plant and equipment, and the loss of institutional learning or expertise (especially if the 
withdrawing municipal had contributed staff which they withdraw) that may accompany 
defection. There is also a contingent cost, that is often overlooked in the literature, associated 
with the mere threat of defection. If other members of a co-operative venture suspect that one 
of the partners is disenchanted with the arrangements, and may therefore defect, then they 
may be more likely to bow to the potential defectors preferences (for instance, altering 
service levels) or even re-distribute the bargaining surplus. As a result the mere threat of 
defection might result in higher transaction costs. 
Agency costs are ‘a cousin of transaction costs’, and refer to expense associated with 
information asymmetry and goal incongruence (Brown and Potoski, 2003, p. 446). In this 
regard, it is important to note that there are two levels of agency in operation with respect to 
shared services. First, municipal executives and elected representatives act as agents of 
municipal taxpayers. Second, representatives on the shared services board or committee act 
as agents for their municipalities. At each level of agency hierarchy it is possible that the 
agents will not faithfully represent the wishes of their principals (either as a result of 
incomplete knowledge of wishes, as a consequence of the heterogeneity of wishes, or due to 
disregard of the principal’s wishes).  
Failure to accurately represent the wishes of principals at either level will erode the efficiency 
dividend that lies at the core of the Decentralisation Theorem (the theorem provides an 
efficiency rationale for provision of goods and services through municipal government; 
Oates, 1999). That is, decentralised government is more efficient largely as a result of 
services being tailored to the different tastes of municipal residents and taxpayers. If these 
different tastes are not communicated clearly and not reflected in the service levels actually 
provided by the cooperative venture, then the very source of efficiencies for decentralised 
government will be largely negated. An additional agency cost occurs when the agent is not 
wholly committed to the idea of shared services (perhaps the agent was compelled by their 
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movements) and this may give rise to the convoy problem (whereby the shared service 
venture is hampered by the level of engagement of the least committed agent; see Dollery et 
al. 2016).  
Figure 2 provides a summary of the nett efficiencies arising from shared services when 
analysis is restricted to the service itself, rather than the entire municipality (𝛽 is included as 
a weighting proportional to both the number and heterogeneity of shared service partners to 
respond to the literature that indicates that nett efficiency is likely to be eroded by multiple 
heterogeneous partners). 
[Please insert Figure 2 here] 
However, we believe that there are a number of exogenous costs that might be overlooked by 
analyses that do not examine nett efficiency at the level of the entire municipality. For 
instance, producing a service co-operatively may result in an erosion of extant economies of 
scope for the municipality. Economies of scope refer to the savings that may be realised when 
a single organisation uses the same factor inputs to produce two or more services. If a service 
is moved from a municipality to a shared service venture, extant economies of scope may be 
diminished thus reducing efficiency when considered at the level of the entire municipality. 
In similar vein, if staff and resources previously dedicated to produce a service that is moved 
to a co-operative venture, are not transferred to the venture, meaningfully redeployed, 
dismissed or sold, then this also will have a deleterious effect on municipal efficiency. It is 
also possible that internal division between and within staff and elected representatives might 
result in further efficiency reductions that will be felt at the municipal level. Time taken to 
resolve differences between staff and representatives has a direct effect on efficiency, but 
there is also an indirect effect that arises from the diversion of organisational attention. 
Indeed, it is quite possible that there will be differences between and within staff and elected 
representative cohorts given that shared services has implications for the level of staffing, 
opportunities for staff advancement, control over service levels and ideology.  
Another exogenous cost relates to residual costs associated with the service that are retained 
by the municipality that might escape notice in a service level analysis. In particular, 
complaints and inquiries are still likely to be directed to the municipality even after the 
service has been shifted to a co-operative venture (thus continuing to consume municipal 
resources). A final potential exogenous cost is the loss of skills that may generate further 
contingency costs and constrain future options for the municipality (Feiock, 2007). 
When we also consider exogenous costs, which might otherwise be overlooked by analyses 
that are restricted to a particular service, nett efficiencies for the entire municipality can be 
depicted as follows: 
[Please insert Figure 3 here] 
As represented in Figure 3 the difficulties in selecting a service amenable to production 
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costs suggests the following proposition, which is the principal objective of our sequent 
empirical inquiry 
Proposition 1: One might reasonably expect there to be a negative association between 
efficiency of an entire municipality and whether or not the municipality was involved in at 
least one shared service arrangement 
The scholarly literature suggests that different types of services are likely to yield different 
efficiency outcomes (see, for example Brown and Potoski, 2005; Feiock, 2007). For instance, 
services that are amenable to measurement may make it less costly for municipalities to 
measure the performance of the co-operative venture (Brown and Potoski, 2003). However, 
services that require single-purpose specific assets and skills (which are difficult to redeploy) 
may increase the relative costs of establishing and operating a shared service (Brown and 
Potoski, 2005). In similar vein, heterogeneity of resident preferences between and within 
municipalities entering into co-operative ventures may also increase the costs, and hence 
reduce the efficiency, of shared services (Feiock 2007; Carr and Hawkins, 2013). To 
investigate the question of service specific effects in a little more detail we developed a 
second, subordinate proposition:  
Proposition 2: One might reasonably expect different types of shared services to exert 
different effects on municipal efficiency in response to variation in barriers to measurability, 
degree of specificity, or heterogeneity of resident preferences. 
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Empirical Methodology 
To investigate the propositions developed earlier we conducted two-stage empirical analyses 
of relative technical efficiency for the 68 general purpose municipalities that constitute the 
jurisdiction of South Australia over  five financial years (2012 to 2016 inclusive). It might be 
noted that municipal government in Australia has a relatively limited remit, compared to 
jurisdictions abroad, that is focussed on the provision of road infrastructure and services to 
properties (such as waste removal; see Grant and Drew, 2016 for a thorough account of 
Australian Local Government). Most services to people – police, health, education and 
welfare – are provided by state and federal government in Australia. In the first stage of our 
analysis we estimated the relative technical efficiency of each municipality for each year by 
employing data envelopment analysis (DEA). In the second stage we regressed the relative 
technical efficiency scores against control variables and indicators responding to whether or 
not the municipality was involved with shared services. 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
DEA measures the relative efficiency of the conversion of inputs into a specified set of 
outputs. DEA was selected to measure relative technical efficiency as it does not require a 
priori specification of functional form (which is often problematic to justify), and allows for 
the inclusion of multiple disaggregated outputs which, whilst not a perfect reflection of 
efficiency, is an improvement on other methodologies (such as unit cost analysis or stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA); Drew et al. 2015). In the calculation of efficiency, an input-
orientation was selected as the output of municipalities are generally considered to be fairly 
exogenous (Worthington and Dollery, 2001). DEA employs linear programming to first 
establish an efficient frontier that represents municipalities which best minimise inputs for the 
level of output produced – these municipalities are assigned a relative technical efficiency 
score of 1.0. The input/output conversion of the remaining municipalities are then compared 
to the frontier and municipalities lying in the interior of the curve are assigned scores less 
than 1, based on their radial distance from comparable peers. Super efficiency scores were 
assigned to municipalities that had input/output conversion ratios exceeding their peers on the 
frontier and these municipalities were identified by imposing a constraint on the linear 
programme that prevented a municipality from using itself as a peer (Coelli et al. 2005).  
Figure 4 provides a graphical depiction of DEA – in this diagram municipality A would be 
assigned a score of 1.0 (as it lies on the frontier), municipality B would be assigned a score 
less than one (because it lies on the interior of the frontier) and municipality C would be 
super-efficient (and hence be assigned a score greater than 1.0). To eliminate potential bias in 
the second stage regressions (which we detail in the next sub-section) a constant returns to 
scale (CRS) model was employed. It is important to note that no infeasible solutions were 
obtained upon utilisation of this method, and that all weightings obtained were non-zero. 
Moreover, to provide additional assurance regarding the validity of the results obtained, a 
supplementary model incorporating bootstrapped1 efficiency scores was also estimated. 
Summary statistics for the efficiency scores obtained using both the super and bootstrapped 
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this increasingly common empirical technique are referred to the seminal work of Cooper et 
al. (2007). 
[Please insert Figure 4 here] 
Just like all empirical estimations our DEA employs proxies to measure output. Use of 
proxies is dictated by data availability and constraints on the number of outputs that can be 
accommodated by the technique (Nunamaker’s (1985) rule restricts the total number of inputs 
and outputs – see also Cooper et al. 2007). We employed a total of five output proxies that 
respond closely to the remit of Australian municipalities – where the single largest cost is the 
provision of road infrastructure (approximately one-fifth of total municipal expenditure 
(SALGGC, 2015)) followed by services directed to properties (Grant and Drew, 2017). 
Proxies, of course, are not perfect representations of output, but we do note that our use of 
DEA has allowed us to include five times as many outputs as other techniques for estimating 
efficiency (for example, SFA) and that we also capture differences in quantity and quality of 
outputs through our controls employed in the second stage regressions (see below). The 
inputs to our DEA were staff and operational expenditure (which are pretty standard inputs 
for most DEAs), and our outputs were sealed roads, unsealed roads (generally graded dirt), 
number of business assessments, number or residential assessments, and other (principally 
farm and vacant lots) assessments (see Table 1). It is important to disaggregate the various 
types of roads and assessments to capture the different costs and services associated with 
them (for instance, farm properties do not receive rubbish collection, and unsealed roads 
generally require more frequent, but less expensive, maintenance). Our DEA specification is 
consistent with a host of studies performed in the Antipodes and readers can consult Drew et 
al. 2015 for an in-depth analysis that confirms our proxy selections as the most appropriate 
case. However, due to the fact that this technique, nor any other technique, can incorporate a 
complete rendering of every municipal output (were the data even available) readers should 
remain cognisant of this potential limitation when considering the evidence (in the same 
manner that readers should be aware of the limitation involving the necessary use of proxies 
in most empirical work within the corpus of scholarly literature). 
[Please insert Table 1 here] 
Second-Stage Regression 
Second-stage regressions were conducted to determine whether there were statistically 
significant associations between municipal efficiency estimates and the use of shared 
services. About a third of municipalities operated at least one shared service during the five 
financial years of analysis. In total we conducted four regressions – the first two regressions 
(Models 1 and 2) measured the association between municipal efficiency and the use of at 
least one shared service arrangement (later disaggregated into eight categories). Thus Models 
1 and 2 respond to the first proposition developed earlier. The next two models (3 and 4) 
replace the single dummy variable for shared services with eight dummy variables, 
representing the different categories to which all shared service arrangements observed could 
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[Please insert Table 2 here] 
Although the efficiency scores obtained under a super-efficiency approach are not bounded 
by an upper limit (evident through the fact that the scores obtained can exceed a value of 1), 
they still contain a lower bound (as the efficiency scores cannot be negative). Furthermore, 
for the supplementary model (Model 4) employing bootstrapped efficiency scores, both an 
upper and lower limit exist (as the efficiency score obtained must lie between 0 and 1). 
Consequently, to account for the censoring inherent in the efficiency scores obtained, a tobit 
model is generally employed. Due to an unfavourable Hausman test result, indicating the 
presence of endogenity, random effects tobit was not used. We therefore conducted a time 
fixed effects tobit (to account for the individual level differences in a fixed slope, rather than 
error term)2. The model employed can be expressed as: 
𝑬𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡         i=1…68  t=1…5 
Where E is the super efficiency score (and bootstrapped efficiency in Model 4), S is a binary 
variable coded 1 if the municipality operates under at least one shared service arrangement 
(note that this coding system was also applied in models that subsequently disaggregated 
shared services into eight individual categories), and 0 otherwise (if they do not have a shared 
service arrangement), X is a vector of control variables which are expected to influence 
municipal efficiency (the full list is provided below and in Table 1), and μ is an independent 
and identically distributed error term. For the second stage regression – employed to answer 
our research question regarding the efficiency effects of shared services – the controls 
selected included the population size (as a proxy for municipal size), population density, the 
demographics of the residents served (measured through the proportion of residents under the 
age of 15, the proportion receiving the aged pension, and the proportion of individuals from 
an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander background, or from a non-English speaking 
background), the socio-economic status of residents (through the median wage received, and 
the proportion of unemployed residents receiving a Newstart allowance) and the federal 
assistance grant revenue received by a municipality. The authors experimented with different 
specifications and found no material difference for the variable of interest (shared services). 
In particular, the inclusion of grants did not affect the statistical significance or sign of the 
shared services dummy, nor did the use of variable returns to scale efficiency scores (or 
bootstrapped scores). 
The population variables were selected to account for the potential presence of economies 
(and diseconomies) of scale in municipal service provision (see Kwon and Feiock, 2010), 
which can serve to increase (or decrease) the efficiency of an individual municipality (note to 
achieve this, and account for the non-linear relationship between costs and output, a quadratic 
term was included for Models 2, 3, and 4). Similarly to account for  potential economies of 
density (whereby the average cost decreases as population density increases; Holcombe and 
Williams, 2008)) the variable of population density was included. Measures of population 
demographics and socio-economic status were included due to strong evidence in existing 
literature on the effect which deprivation has in influencing the demands of residents for 
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Andrews, 2004). In an analogous reasoning, the urbanity of the municipality was controlled 
for in response to the well-documented evidence of different service levels and unit costs 
which are incurred in rural and urban areas respectively3 - specifically, persons in rural areas 
generally receive less services (for instance waste collection may not be available) and lower 
quality services (culverts rather than drain infrastructure; see Grant and Drew, 2017). Finally 
the inclusion of data relating to federal assistance grants is justified due to the previously 
observed impacts on raising municipal spending (known as the flypaper effect), potentially 
serving to lower municipal efficiency (Dollery and Worthington, 1995). Variables have been 
transformed into logarithms where necessary to account for skewed distributions. Summary 
measures for the variables employed in this analysis are presented in Table 1. 
Data for the analysis was sourced from the respective audited financial statements obtained 
from municipalities, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) National Regional Profile 
(ABS, 2017), and the South Australian Local Government Grants Commission Annual 
Reports (see, for example, SALGGC, 2015)4 The various reports were combined to provide 
full and consistent strongly-balanced panels of data (that is, the ABS (2017) report goes back 
to 2012 and this data was augmented with the relevant data from other sources to produce a 
single consistent database for analysis). The data relating to the shared service arrangements 
undertaken by municipalities was obtained from the Note 19 (although this number may 
occasionally vary) of the Notes to and Forming Part of the Financial Statements examining 
Joint Ventures and Interests in Other Entities, supplemented by the appendices to the annual 
reports relating to annual reports of regional entities and subsidiaries. If a municipality did 
not operate under shared service arrangements, this information will not be present in the 
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Associations Between Relative Technical Efficiency and Shared Services 
To investigate the two propositions developed from theory we ran a total of four second-stage 
regressions. The first two models were directed at determining whether a statistically 
significant association existed between the provision of at least one shared service and 
relative technical efficiency (TE), with appropriate controls. The third model examined the 
association between the eight different types of shared services provided by the 68 South 
Australian municipalities (over the period 2012 to 2016 inclusive) and relative TE and was 
designed to cast further light on Proposition 2. This analysis was then repeated in Model 4, in 
order to provided additional assurance regarding our results (we also re-ran the regressions 
using OLS and found no real difference in the regressors of interest). Our results are 
summarised in Table 3. 
[PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In Model 1 we ran our second-stage regression with a linear term to measure the effect of 
population size, and employed a single dummy variable to control for whether or not the 
municipality participated in at least one formal shared service arrangements. All of the 
regressors had signs consistent with what we might expect given the extant literature: That is, 
efficiency was positively associated with population density (economies of density, where a 
1% increase in density was associated with an increase in relative TE of 0.0006), distribution 
of age cohorts (a one unit increase in the proportion of residents under 15 was associated with 
an increase in relative TE of 0.025 and a 1% increase in persons receiving an aged pension 
was associated with an increase in relative TE of 0.0028), and proportion of persons speaking 
a language other than English at home (where a 1% increase in the proportion of NESB 
persons was associated with an increase in relative TE of 0.0004). Moreover, statistically 
significant negative associations were found for median wage (an increase of $1,000 in the 
median income was associated with a decrease of relative TE in the order of 0.008), 
proportion of indigenous persons (a 1% increase was associated with a 0.00067 decrease of 
relative TE), proportion of persons receiving Newstart welfare benefits (a 1% increase in the 
proportion of Newstart recipients was associated with a 0.0018 decrease in relative TE) and 
population size (a 1% increase in population was associated with a decrease in relative TE of 
0.0018). Rural municipalities were more efficient than urban municipalities (which are the 
reference category), ceteris paribus. In general the control variables only had relatively small 
associations with relative TE (given that super-efficiency scores were distributed at an 
average of 0.876) but their statistical significance confirms their importance to a robust 
analysis of the association between shared services and relative TE. 
Notably the dummy variable for shared services in Model 1 was statistically significant at the 
5% level and suggests that, holding all other factors constant, municipalities that participate 
in at least one shared service might be expected to have lower efficiency in the order of 
0.0677 (recall that the super-efficiency score did not require transformation and that the 
response might be interpreted in terms of the average of the distribution which was 0.876). It 
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However, there is a good deal of literature to suggest that u-shaped production functions 
might be more appropriate for second stage regression analyses (we note that under the 
constant returns to scale efficiency specification there is no size constraint regarding which 
peers municipalities are benchmarked to and hence a quadratic specification is more 
plausible). When we added the higher order population term (Model 2) we found that most 
regressors attenuated slightly. Moreover the population coefficients suggest a local minima at 
around 75,183 – that is, efficiency is expected to reduce for populations up to this point, then 
recover (at least in part) for larger population sizes.  
In Model 2 our main regressor of interest was statistically significant at the 1% level, and 
suggested slightly higher reductions in relative TE in the order of 0.0847, ceteris paribus. 
That is, our more comprehensive analysis of the association between municipal efficiency 
and the provision of at least one shared service suggests that participation in co-operative 
ventures might be expected to result in considerably lower relative TE (which we have now 
demonstrated at the highest level of statistical significance). Given the distribution of relative 
TE (mean 0.876), this is quite a  strong association. Thus Model 2 confirms the strong 
evidence to support Proposition 1 which we developed earlier. 
Proposition 2 suggests that different shared services might be associated with different effects 
on municipal efficiency in response to variations in measurability, specificity and 
heterogeneity of resident preferences. To investigate this proposition further, in Model 3 we 
replaced our single shared service dummy variable with the exhaustive list of eight different 
shared service types (that is, all shared services in operation in South Australian municipal 
government over the period of analysis were assigned to one of eight categories) and found 
that three of the shared services had statistically significant coefficients. Specifically, shared 
services for waste collection, flood mitigation works, and procurement had statistically 
significant and relatively responsive coefficients (reductions in efficiency in the order of 
0.0816, 0.0925, and 0.1197 respectively), ceteris paribus. These results serve to confirm that 
different types of shared service arrangements might be expected to exert different effects on 
municipal efficiency. Moreover, there were a few positive associations (shared health and 
shared equipment) that, whilst not statistically significant, do hint at the possibility that some 
types of arrangements might have beneficial effects on municipal efficiency. Unfortunately 
there was no obvious pattern between the magnitude of associations and the characteristics of 
the three services (see Table 4). Thus whilst we have been able to show that the efficiency 
outcomes associated with different shared services do vary, we haven’t been able to cast 
much light on the importance of measurability, specificity and homogeneity which have been 
proposed in the literature to be predictors of success in shared service arrangements (see, 
Brown and Potoski, 2005; Carr and Hawkins, 2013; Feiock, 2007), and this is therefore an 
important area for future scholarly work. 
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Public Policy Implications and Conclusion 
Despite being oft lauded as a panacea for waning municipal efficiency our evidence suggests 
that shared services may very well result in reduced municipal efficiency. However, there 
still remain a number of good reasons to contemplate shared services including inter alia 
potential improvement to service levels, access to expertise that might otherwise be difficult 
to attract, more effective regional planning, and internalisation of externalities. We simply 
draw attention to the fact that the first proposition derived from theory and our robust 
empirical evidence runs counter to many service specific assertions and that, as a result, it can 
no longer be considered reasonable to pursue shared services on the assumption of enhanced 
efficiency. 
However, the evidence that we tender should not be interpreted to suggest that there is no 
possibility of shared services enhancing municipal efficiency. As we noted in the formulation 
of our propositions selecting shared services that are amendable to economies of scale, 
ensuring that the total output of partners does not incur diseconomies of scale, prioritising 
arrangements that select a small group of largely homogenous partners, minimising 
transaction and agency costs, and paying  close attention to exogenous costs (being prepared 
to make the hard decisions regarding rationalisation of staff and assets) might all be expected 
to increase the likelihood of nett increases to municipal efficiency. Furthermore, our analysis 
of disaggregated shared services suggests that different types of services may exert different 
effects on municipal efficiency. However, future scholarly work is required to provide more 
definitive guidance to practitioners regarding the results from our secondary proposition. 
The literature has considered a number of contractual and institutional remedies that might be 
used to limit transaction costs, in particular (and hence maximise efficiency outcomes arising 
from co-operative arrangements), and these also deserve careful consideration by parties 
contemplating shared services. Three of the most prominent solutions are: (i) use of binding 
contracts or statutes (to prevent defection costs and aide enforcement of obligations; see, 
Dollery et al. 2016), (ii) use of adaptive agreements such as memoranda of understanding 
(that minimise upfront negotiation costs and allow parties the flexibility to respond to 
unpredictable events and opportunities sequent to the commencement of shared service 
arrangements; Carr and Hawkins, 2013), and (iii) mediated arrangements (whereby higher 
tiers of government, regulators or peak bodies offer to provide independent facilitation and 
hence reduce information and bargaining costs, disproportionate division costs and perhaps 
defection costs; see, Kwon and Feiock, 2010). Because the institutional remedies target 
specific costs associated with shared services it will be important for future research to try to 
tease out what kinds of transaction and agency costs have the greatest impact on municipal 
efficiency. This will be a difficult task to complete given the problems in quantifying some 
costs and obtaining sufficiently detailed data.  
Future research might also examine the dynamics of shared service effects on municipal 
efficiency. The extant theory suggests that some upfront costs might be recouped over time 
so a study employing variables to measure the length of time for which a service had operated 
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are good reasons to suppose that multiple experiences with shared services might result in 
better contract management that could help to optimise municipal efficiency outcomes 
(Brown and Potoski, 2005). Therefore, further guidance might be forthcoming for 
practitioners from a future study that examined the nett efficiency outcomes from multiple 
shared service arrangements. In addition, a study that compares specific service level 
perceptions of savings with actual service level and municipality savings would (in 
combination with in-depth interviews) go some way towards explaining the reasons for 
apparent discordance between perceptions on shared services and actual outcomes.  
In conclusion, this study set out to address an important gap in the scholarly literature – 
namely to broaden the evidential base to include analysis of efficiency outcomes arising from 
shared services at the level of the entire municipality, to augment the extant service level 
studies. Our analysis of an entire jurisdiction over a five year panel of data provides evidence 
that shared services may indeed reduce overall municipal efficiency, which is probably 
contrary to most people’s assumptions. This much needed contribution to the scholarly 
evidence base should give many stakeholders cause to pause and reconsider the efficacy of 
shared service arrangements for municipal government. For instance, scholars now have a 
research agenda (including a number of recommendations for additional required work) upon 
which to focus future efforts. Municipal executives and decision makers can now no longer 
reasonably assume that shared service arrangements will necessarily bring about desired 
increases to efficiency. Moreover, by making reference to the theoretical framework we 
developed earlier municipal executives and decision makers have been presented with a 
useful tool for identifying the determinants of efficiency maximising shared service 
arrangements. In addition, regulatory authorities now have good reason to consider more 
carefully the design and support for shared service arrangements that might be considered in 
their particular jurisdiction.  
We emphasise again that this evidence should not be construed as suggesting that shared 
services can’t improve efficiency – rather the take-home message of this paper is that 
arrangements must be very carefully designed if improvements in efficiency are the objective 
of co-operative ventures. Indeed, when it comes to co-operative ventures, our empirical 
evidence would seem to suggest that without very careful planning and execution that  a 
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Endnotes 
1. Bootstrapping is a re-sampling procedure that is designed principally to address 
sampling error (which is not strictly relevant here given that we had a census of 
municipalities) but has become rather de rigueur in DEA estimations. 
2. The variable of interest was close to time-invariant thus fixed-effects panel 
regressions were not indicated 
3. Note that the urban council category is used as the reference category 
4. Note that the 2016 grant data is an estimate contained within the SALGGC report. 
5. Note that the shared service categories presented above may be comprised of several 
homogeneous sub-categories (for instance health shared services incorporates the 
sharing of health inspection, immunisation, provision of healthcare-related 
information) which cannot be separately tested due to insufficient sample sizes. Also 
note that this is an exhaustive list of the shared service arrangements undertaken by 
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Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Data Envelopment Analysis 
Staff Expenses Annual staff costs (in $000) 10,201.41 12,493.56 
Operational Expenses Total expenditure less staff costs, 
depreciation and borrowing costs 
(in $000) 
11,837.16 13,679.19 
Sealed Roads Length of sealed (bitumen) roads 
(in kilometres) 
267.689 225.271 
Unsealed Roads Length of unsealed (graded dirt) 
roads (in kilometres) 
833.656 839.280 
Business Assessments Number of businesses with a 
municipal area 
732.465 878.077 
Residential Assessments Number of rateable residential 
properties within a municipal area 
10,036.02 14,053.46 
Other Assessments Total assessments less residential 
and business assessments. 
Generally farming and vacant 
properties 
2,231.253 1,509.801 
Second-Stage Regression    
Super Efficiency  Constant returns to scale super-
efficiency score for each year 
0.876 0.270 
Bootstrapped Efficiency Constant returns to scale 
bootstrapped score for each year 
0.826 0.176 
Population (ln) Population size for each municipal 
area 
9.219 1.389 
Population squared (ln) Population size term squared 86.919 25.872 
Population density (ln) Population size divided by the area 
of the municipal 
-1.893 3.188 
Under 15 Proportion of persons under 15 
years of age 
17.863 2.867 
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NESB (ln) Proportion of persons speaking a 
language other than English at 
home 
1.489 1.057 
ATSI (ln) Proportion of indigenous persons 0.468 0.881 
Median Wage ($’000) Median wage of wage earners in 
the municipal area 
38.867 8.292 
Grants  Financial assistance grant per 
person 
343.533 409.507 
Shared Services Average number of shared services 
per municipality 
0.75 0.89 
    
 
Table 2. Shared Service Classifications5. 
Shared Service Type Definition Example 
Waste Collection of solid waste Rubbish bin collections 
Water Water provision and/or stormwater 
management 
Delivering drinking water 
to households 
Health Community health protection  Restaurant health 
inspections 
Flood Floodplain management and 
infrastructure maintenance 
Levee repair, river debris 
removal 
Transport Community transport services  Community buses  
Cemetery Operation of cemeteries Digging and maintaining 
burial plots  
Equipment Joint ownership of equipment required 
to perform municipal functions 
Sharing of road 
maintenance machinery 
Procurement Sourcing of goods, partners and 
suppliers 
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Table 3. Second Stage Regressions of South Australian Municipal Efficiency, 2012-2016. 
 Model 1 Super 
Efficiency  
Model 2 Super 
Efficiency  
Model 3 Super 
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(0.0674) (0.0357) 






































1.962 2.206 2.362 1.453 
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 4. Expected Characteristics of Statistically Significant Shared Services. 
Service Type Significant 
Association 
Measurability Specificity Homogeneity of 
Preferences 
Waste -0.0816 High High (rubbish trucks 
and refuse tips are 









-0.0925 Low (flood 
events are 
unpredictable) 
High (assets such as 

















employed and staff 
would be re-
deployable) 
 
 
